

15 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Station  
THRU :   
FROM :   
SUBJECT : Study Evaluating the Viet Cong Anti-Election Effort

The attached  study summarizes known Viet Cong plans and threats to disrupt the 11 September elections and their actual deeds in the immediate pre-election period and on election day.

Because of the overwhelming success of the election, expressed in the huge nation-wide voter participation and the failure of the Viet Cong to disrupt the elections, the answers that this study had initially meant to provide became apparent almost before the polls closed. As a result, despite much probing and analysis of available field reports received in response to specific questions, little has come to light that has not already been said by others.

The extremely efficient and well-coordinated GVN security measures, and the apparent desire of the populace to actively participate in this event unquestionably played a major part in the abysmal failure of the Viet Cong effort. However, other factors contributing to this failure and worthy of mention are discussed in the study.

The large number of manhours expended in this effort have produced a 75-page document, in effect a statistical tabulation of Viet Cong threats and known plans with a listing of reported incidents in furtherance of such plans. Hopefully, this document will serve a useful purpose in predicting events in a future crisis. It may also provide the basis for other studies on VC plans vis-a-vis performance of a long range nature. This tabulation will be completed as late reports are received from the field.

ARMY review(s) completed.

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## AN EVALUATION OF THE VIET CONG ANTI-ELECTION EFFORT

### Background:

1. This paper is an attempt to summarize the anti-election policy of the Viet Cong (VC), its method of implementation, and its success or failure. At the time of writing (14 September) information is still being received on specific plans and incidents that occurred in various provinces. Consequently this paper should be considered a preliminary assessment.



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### Summary:

3. The VC failed to accomplish their stated objective of "crushing" the Government of Vietnam (GVN) elections for a Constituent Assembly. They had virtually no success in deterring voters from voting or candidates from campaigning. The result was the most ignominious political defeat that the VC have ever suffered.

4. The reasons for their failure are basically twofold. They overestimated their own influence in GVN controlled areas, and many of their plans were nullified by the highly effective security measures organized by the GVN in the pre-electoral and electoral period. The VC failure, in a sense, reflects a weakness in their district and village level organization, and an inability to accomplish political gains without the use of military force.

### Viet Cong Planning:

5. Overall VC plans to disrupt the election appear to have been developed in their main outline by the Regional

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People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) committees after the decision to actively oppose the elections was made by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The Provincial Party committees apparently were instrumental only in assigning some tasks to provincial level armed elements and organizing special training courses for Party cadre. The task of drawing up specific plans and targets for harassment and obstruction was left to individual district committees. It was thus mainly the district committees and village chapters of the PRP who were responsible for the implementation of the anti-election campaign.

6. Once the decision had been made to actively oppose the elections the VC embarked on a comprehensive strategy utilizing all the forces under their control. The means included propaganda, demonstrations, terrorism, and plans for large scale attacks. This strategy was evident throughout South Vietnam.

#### Propaganda Campaign:

7. The VC propaganda campaign, initiated in July, was intensive.<sup>1</sup> Hundreds of meetings were held in all parts of the country. In those areas where VC propaganda teams were not able to penetrate, whispering campaigns and leaflets were disseminated by VC agents. The propaganda themes were basically the same although some variations were noticed from province to province. Basically the VC told the people that the elections were a fraud perpetrated on the Vietnamese people by the Americans to enable them to expand and intensify the war. Therefore the Viet Cong intended to attack candidates, GVN election cadre and installations prior to and on election day itself. The people were warned to have nothing to do with the elections. If they were forced to vote they should invalidate their ballots. Those who disregarded this warning would be punished severely.

#### Intimidation and Threats:

8. The VC complemented their propaganda efforts with a systematic attempt to intimidate the population both by threats and by acts of terror. In many cases specific threats

1. See attachments

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were made to bomb polling places, attack lines of communications, and assassinate candidates and anyone who voted. Candidates were threatened with death if they did not withdraw from the campaign. Plans were made to confiscate voter's and identification cards from the population. Terrorist teams were activated to attack polling places, GVN installations, and personnel by both fire and assault. In the week before the election VC radio broadcasts tied virtually every incident perpetrated by the VC to their anti-election campaign. This campaign successfully made known to the Vietnamese voter the VC position in regards to the elections, and perhaps backfired against them.

Viet Cong Initiated Incidents:

9. The rate of incidents, as tabulated by MACV,<sup>1</sup> did rise during the last week preceding the election, with a total of 651 incidents of all types being recorded in all parts of the country. One hundred seventy-seven of these came on election day itself. However, it is significant to note that the MACV incident total for the week of 5-11 September 1965 was 637, or only 14 less than the period of most sustained anti-election activity in 1966.

Incidents vs. Capabilities:

10.

VC threats in most provinces exceeded their capabilities. Whether this was known to the VC before the campaign started or was only later discovered by them, the result has been a serious blow to VC credibility in making good their threats.

Danang:

11. The greatest surprise came from I Corps, where the VC were undoubtedly counting on the influence of the remnants of the Buddhist struggle forces to do much of their work for them. Their failure here can be regarded as an overestimation of their capabilities for taking advantage

1. Includes all types of incidents, many having no relation to the election.

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of the dissident elements in the area and the unexpectedly efficient GVN security measures.

Nha Trang and Ban Me Thuot:

25X1 12. [ ] the GVN controlled areas in both the Central Highlands and the Coastal Lowlands were made virtually impenetrable to VC influence on election day by the large number of spoiling operations and air and artillery interdictions carried out by GVN/US military forces. In addition the reconciliation between FULRO and the GVN shortly before election day heightened considerably Montagnard interest in and enthusiasm for the elections in which several FULRO candidates won.

Bien Hoa and Saigon-Gia Dinh:

25X1 13. [ ] the results again stemmed from efficient and well-coordinated GVN security measures and the unwillingness or inability of the VC to commit their main force units even in provinces where they held a preponderance of forces. The Saigon/Gia Dinh area had the lowest percentage of eligible voters casting ballots of any of the large metropolitan areas of South Vietnam. This was probably the result of greater apathy among the more politically sophisticated urban population where GVN pressures to vote could not be as decisive as in some rural areas.

My Tho:

25X1 14. [ ] was the scene of the most concentrated VC armed activity on election day. It was also the area where the VC were most able to make good on their threats to attack district towns and lines of communications. However, their results still fell far short of their plans and expectations.

Can Tho:

25X1 15. [ ] the VC again did not have the capability to carry out their many threats. Despite a relatively high number of incidents the GVN was able to effectively protect GVN areas against significant VC incursions.

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In addition Hoa Hao influence and active participation generated sufficient interest among themselves and other political groups to assure a large turnout.

Possibility of Future Incidents:

16. To date (14 September) there has been no reported instance of Viet Cong reprisals against either candidates or the population. However, given the magnitude of their defeat, the VC can be expected to make some kind of face-saving gesture in the near future, possibly keyed to the formal convening of the Constituent Assembly on 26 September.

Reasons for Viet Cong Failure:

17. It is clear that in the final event, the VC chose not to commit their full military assets to disrupt the elections. There were no instances of VC main force units being committed to anti-election attacks despite several reports [ ] that this was planned, especially in the Saigon area. Even in provinces where the VC enjoyed a preponderance of forces (Binh Duong) these forces were not used.

18. Based on present evidence it appears that GVN security measures, including ARVN/US sweep and spoiling operations during the final week of the campaign were primarily responsible for blunting whatever plans the VC had for military attacks. These plans were reported time and time again, from all parts of the country, and included the overrunning of district capitals and attacks on security forces. Also any large-scale action on the part of the VC would inevitably involve large losses of military and/or terrorist personnel, given the extensive and efficiently conducted country-wide security measures in effect. It is entirely possible that such losses were considered prohibitive and the PRP decided to abandon many of its plans rather than run the risk of losing trained and difficult-to-replace cadres.

19. Another contributing factor which may have influenced VC action was the widespread publicity given the elections and VC plans to disrupt them, the presence of many newspapermen and foreign observers, and the knowledge that the GVN

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would attribute a poor turnout of voters to VC terrorism and military pressure. Thus it is likely that the decision was made shortly before election day to confine military attacks to hit and run attacks by fire and rely on the effectiveness of their political apparatus, voter apathy, the expected influence of Buddhist opposition, and their own reputation for making good their threats.

Conclusions:

20. The negligible influence which the Viet Cong political apparatus (the People's Revolutionary Party - PRP) had on the total vote will undoubtedly result in a serious reappraisal of the PRP's effectiveness at the local level, an area that up to now has been considered the key strong-point in VC strategy. It should be borne in mind, however, that the elections could only be held in GVN-controlled areas and that some provinces are so completely dominated by the VC (i.e., An Xuyen) that election statistics can be very misleading concerning the actual political realities in the province. Nevertheless, the GVN has demonstrated in a resounding fashion that it has the technical ability and political sophistication to coordinate its various military and security forces in a highly skilled manner to achieve an important political end. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Viet Cong political influence when not supported by armed force, is not the power that it once was and perhaps may have been overestimated.

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NUMBER OF VC ANTI-ELECTION INCIDENTS  25X1

BY CATEGORY AND REGION

(Based on incomplete reporting)

	Danang	Nha Trang	Ban Me Thuot	Bien Hoa	Can Tho	My Tho	Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh	Total
*Propaganda	22	26	8	18	11	28	9	122
*Confiscation of ID or voter cards	3	-	-	2	4	5	3	17
Kidnappings, Assassinations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters	5	1	1	4	3	7	13	34
Attacks on polling places or ballot boxes	5	-	2	10	1	10	11	39
Interdiction of LOC's by armed attack or sabotage	2	-	1	1	2	3	3	12
Attacks on hamlets, villages, district townships, and provincial capitals	5	2	-	7	7	12	2	35
Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts	2	4	4	3	1	4	5	23
Total	44	33	16	45	29	69	46	282

\* From 1 August through 11 September. All other categories are from 1 through 11 September.



## NUMBER OF ANTI-ELECTION INCIDENTS

25X1

## BY CATEGORY AND PROVINCE

(Based on incomplete reporting)

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Danang Region</u>	22	3	5	5	2	5	2	44
Quang Tri	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Thua Thien	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	6
Quang Nam	3	-	2	2	-	3	1	11
Quang Tin	13	-	2	-	-	-	-	15
Quang Ngai	-	1	1	2	1	2	-	7
<u>Ban Me Thuot Region</u>	8	-	1	2	1	-	4	16
Kontum	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Pleiku	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Darlac	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Phu Bon	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Quang Duc	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tuyen Duc	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	8
Lam Dong	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	3
<u>Nha Trang Region</u>	26	-	1	-	-	2	4	33
Binh Dinh	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	4
Phu Yen	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	6
Khanh Hoa	16	-	-	-	-	1	1	18
Binh Thuan	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	2
Ninh Thuan	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	3

A - Propaganda

E - Interdiction of LOC's by armed attack or sabotage

B - Confiscation of ID or voter cards

F - Attacks on hamlets, villages, district townships, and provincial capitals

C - Kidnappings, assassinations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters

G - Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts

D - Attacks on polling places or ballot boxes

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Bien Hoa Region</u>	18	2	4	10	1	7	3	45
Phuoc Long	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Long Khanh	4	1	-	1	-	5	-	11
Binh Tuy	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Phuoc Tuy	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	4
Bien Hoa	2	1	1	6	-	-	1	11
Binh Long	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Tay Ninh	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	3
Binh Duong	2	-	-	1	-	2	1	6
Hau Nghia	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	5
<u>My Tho Region</u>	28	5	7	10	3	12	4	69
Long An	4	-	3	1	1	-	1	10
Go Cong	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
Dinh Tuong	12	5	1	8	1	1	-	28
Kien Hoa	9	-	-	-	-	1	1	11
Kien Tuong	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	3
Kien Phong	1	-	-	1	-	3	1	6
Vinh Long	-	-	1	-	1	2	-	4
Vinh Binh	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	4
<u>Can Tho Region</u>	11	4	3	1	2	7	1	29
Chau Duc	1	1	-	-	1	2	-	5
An Giang	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
Phong Dinh	3	2	3	-	-	3	-	11
Ba Xuyen	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Kien Giang	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Chuong Thien	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bac Lieu	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	6
An Xuyen	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
<u>Saigon-Cholon</u>	2	-	7	5	1	1	2	18
<u>Gia Dinh</u>	7	3	6	6	2	1	3	28

A - Propaganda

B - Confiscation of ID or voter cards

C - Kidnappings, assassinations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters

D - Attacks on polling

E - Interdiction of LOC's by armed attack or sabotage

F - Attacks on hamlets, villages, district townships, and provincial capitals

G - Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts

## HAMLET EVALUATION CRITERIA

	D	C	B	A
Hamlet militia units insufficient. But VC retain capability to attack with local village guerrilla units. District and district VC activity increased, especially in border of adjacent districts.	Hamlet militia units insufficient. Most weapons lost. But: Armed activity in nearby villages. District unit retains combat effectiveness. MF or provincial units retain bases in district.	Village guerrilla unit eliminated. Guerrillas in neighboring villages insufficient. But: District unit retains some capability to operate. MF units may remain in district, or have bases in adjacent districts.	District unit insufficient. But: MF or province units still active in adjacent districts.	District unit is eliminated. No militar activity in district during the period. No MF or province units in adjacent districts.
VC structure not yet neutralized. Some overt activity in hamlet, at night. Adjacent hamlets are also disturbed.	No overt terrorism in hamlet, but slight risk continuing active VC activity. Village or district unit still operating. Some hamlet activity. Possible to hamlet.	No indications overt VC activity in village, but some in adjacent villages. Some VC activity in village. Threatened of hamlet unit in district.	No indications of overt activity in village. VC village organiza- tion eliminated. Numbers accounted for. No terrorism in adjacent villages. Free access to hamlet.	No indications overt activity in adjacent villages. VC district structure ineffective. VC district structure ineffective. Free access to hamlet.
VC friendly units in hamlet only in daytime. No mid- day defense plan. No RF or VC fearfulness. Located nearby. Some hamlet police informants. No hamlet intelligence not organized. No police presence.	Armed units in hamlet overnight. No RF or VC activity. Hamlet defense force being developed. VC cadre infiltration. Hamlet intelligence system being organized. Police presence negligible.	No external force in hamlet. But active patrolling RF. No RF or VC activity in hamlet. No VC infiltration. No neutralization. No police and security operations.	Hamlet force and police reliable and active. Police presence in hamlet active. Police and intelligence system being organized. No VC infiltration.	Hamlet force and police reliable and active. Police presence in hamlet active. Police and intelligence system being organized. No VC infiltration.
VC administrative development.	Village council, hamlet council, but ineffective. No real VC administrative presence in hamlet.	Village council, hamlet council, but ineffective. No real VC administrative presence in hamlet.	Hamlet administration operating. No VC administrative presence in hamlet.	Hamlet administration operating. No VC administrative presence in hamlet.
Health, Education and Welfare Development	No GVN sponsored facilities operating.	Health facilities, GVN sponsored. INEAC operating. No VC facilities operating.	Health facilities, GVN sponsored. INEAC operating. No VC facilities operating.	Health facilities, GVN sponsored. INEAC operating. No VC facilities operating.
Economic Development	Markets, no GVN sponsored development. Markets, no GVN sponsored development.	Markets, no GVN sponsored development. Markets, no GVN sponsored development.	Markets, no GVN sponsored development. Markets, no GVN sponsored development.	Markets, no GVN sponsored development. Markets, no GVN sponsored development.

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# HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET\*

DIRECTIONS FOR COMPLETING HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET : All hamlets are to be evaluated except those that are considered by the subsector evaluator to be under VC control. It is suggested that a separate Worksheet be used for each evaluated hamlet. During the month, update the evaluation and the problem responses as necessary. At the end of the month review the worksheets. It is recommended that the response selected for each of the 18 indicators be entered in the righthand column. Entries that differ from those made in the preceding month should be transferred to the Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form (HESF) for transmittal to MACV in Saigon. If worksheet entries are made in pencil, the same form can be used repeatedly.

1. Identify the hamlet by name and location at the top of the Worksheet. Type of hamlet refers to RD Plan hamlet types: Ap Doi Moi (ADM), Ap Tan Sinh (ATS), Ap Cung Co (ACC), or Ap Binh Dinh (ABD). Use a check mark to indicate whether or not the hamlet is in a National Priority Area (NPA). Enter the best available population figure and indicate by a check mark whether the figure is reliable or unreliable. A reliable figure would fall within 10% of an accurate head count in the opinion of the subsector evaluator. Use a check mark to record that the hamlet has been visited during the month by a US District Team member or other designated US personnel and/or by a member of the GVN District staff.

2. For each of the 18 indicators, select the response that best represents the hamlet conditions during the month. The brief responses given on the Worksheet are intended to suggest steps in progress from E to A. Refer to Joint MACV-OCO Directive 1-67, 2 Jan 67, Annex F, Guidance for Evaluating HES, for more complete discussion. It should be understood that within each indicator, signs of progress in one rating, "D" for example, are implied in a related "C" rating if not repeated in the description of the "C" rating. The responses refer to the hamlet itself unless otherwise stated.

3. Enter in the boxes at the far right the number that represents the confidence you have in the validity of the information upon which your ratings for each factor were based: (1) No confidence; (2) Low confidence; (3) Medium confidence; (4) High confidence; (5) Complete confidence.

4. Changes in the wording of indicators are printed in upper case.

## HAMLET PROBLEMS DURING MONTH

Select the one best answer for each section of each question

1. Incidents of misconduct by friendly elements adversely affecting friendly relations with the hamlet populace:
  - a. US Military. ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
  - b. Other FWMAF ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
  - c. ARVN ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
  - d. RF/PF ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
  - e. RD Team ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
2. Actions by friendly elements during military operations adversely affecting relations with hamlet populace:  
(including but not limited to fire from any type of weapon, destructive passage within hamlet area, defoliation)
  - ☐ 1. None;
  - ☐ 2. Minor only.
  - ☐ 3. Serious
  - ☐ 4. Unknown.
3. Corruption or tyranny of hamlet or village officials:
  - ☐ 1. No indications
  - ☐ 2. Rumored.
  - ☐ 3. Suspected but no proof.
  - ☐ 4. Solid indication.
  - ☐ 5. Unknown.

Continued on page 3.

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\* This Worksheet supersedes first edition, 2 Jan 1967

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4. Support of hamlet self-defense force other than PF by district and/or province officials:

- ☐ 1. Received adequate support as requested.
- ☐ 2. Some support received but inadequate.
- ☐ 3. Support promised but not received.
- ☐ 4. Support needed but none promised.
- ☐ 5. Has self-defense force but outside support not required.
- ☐ 6. Has no self-defense force.
- ☐ 7. Unknown.

5. Supplies from outside hamlet or village for self-help projects:

a. From GVN sources

- ☐ 1. On time and adequate.
- ☐ 2. Delayed but adequate.
- ☐ 3. Inadequate and delayed.
- ☐ 4. Promised but none received.
- ☐ 5. Promised for future delivery.
- ☐ 6. None required.
- ☐ 7. Unknown.

b. From non-GVN sources

- ☐ 1. On time and adequate.
- ☐ 2. Delayed but adequate.
- ☐ 3. Inadequate and delayed.
- ☐ 4. Promised but none received.
- ☐ 5. Promised for future delivery.
- ☐ 6. None required.
- ☐ 7. Unknown.

6. Access to drinking water:

a. Local sources of drinking water are inadequate.

- ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

b. Plans and/or work underway to improve local drinking water supply

- ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

7. Refugee problems:

a. What percent of the hamlet population are temporary residents who are refugees?

- ☐ 1. None or very few
- ☐ 2. 10-25 %
- ☐ 3. 25-50%
- ☐ 4. More than 50%
- ☐ 5. 100% (refugee camps only).
- ☐ 6. Unknown.

b. Is GVN assistance adequate to enable them to subsist?

- ☐ 1. None required.
- ☐ 2. Required and adequate.
- ☐ 3. Required but inadequate.
- ☐ 4. Not applicable (refugees only).
- ☐ 5. Unknown.

8. Tax collection (in kind or in cash):

a. By the Viet-Cong.

- ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

b. By the GVN

- ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

9. US Advisor's access to hamlet:

a. By surface from district headquarters:

- ☐ 1. Weapons not necessary.
- ☐ 2. No special security arrangements necessary but weapons must be carried.
- ☐ 3. Special security arrangements necessary.
- ☐ 4. Not feasible except by accompanying an operation.
- ☐ 5. Access unfeasible.
- ☐ 6. Unknown.

b. From airstrip or helicopter pad nearest to hamlet:

- ☐ 1. Weapons not necessary.
- ☐ 2. No special security arrangements necessary but weapons must be carried.
- ☐ 3. Special security arrangements necessary.
- ☐ 4. Not feasible except by accompanying an operation.
- ☐ 5. Access unfeasible
- ☐ 6. Unknown.

10. Condition of main routes from hamlet to village center:

- ☐ 1. In good repair, adequate for current traffic.
- ☐ 2. Being repaired or improved (relocated, dredged, new bridge, etc.)
- ☐ 3. Difficult or dangerous to travel because of poor repair.
- ☐ 4. Impassable (flooded, bridge out, stream dried up, etc.)
- ☐ 5. Unknown.

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DATE: 29 Sep 66

25X1 FROM:	TO	INITIAL	DATE	COMMENTS
1				
2				
3				
25X1 4			29 <sup>th</sup>	NO The study, as requested, for Amb. Porter; this study was later put into FVS format and disseminated as FVS-13,764
5				
6				
7				
8	AMB. PORTER			AS PER YOUR REQUEST.
9				
25X1 10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
25X1 15		P		Is this our file copy? - NO
16				If so, make sure G. Allen
17	George Allen	A		sees it the next time he
25X1 18				is in. If it is an extra,
19				route to him, for return
25X1 20				to us. it's an extra
21				
22				

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